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Abstract: The conferralist account of social properties that Ásta develops and 
defends in Categories We Live By is persuasive in many ways. Conferralism could 
however do better, by its own lights, at handling the phenomenon of intersection-
ality. This paper first suggests a friendly amendment to the schema for conferrals 
that Asta offers. This helps to explain the difficulty concerning intersectional-
ity. Finally, the paper suggests a way of developing the conferralist account that 
would resolve this difficulty.
Keywords: Ásta; Conferralism; Intersectionality; Gender; Race; Status.
1   Introduction
Ásta’s (2018) book Categories We Live By is a landmark text in contemporary 
social ontology. It investigates human social kinds, such as gender and race, in 
a way that seamlessly blends metaphysics, social philosophy, social ontology, 
and feminist philosophy. As Ásta observes, “camping out at that intersection can 
be a cold and lonely endeavour” (6): each group has a different conception of 
what philosophy should aim to do, and there is plenty of mutual suspicion. As a 
fellow camper at that intersection, I know this all too well – which is why I am so 
heartened by the way that this excellent and exciting book manages to make that 
intersection a warmer and more inviting place.
I find the conferralist account of social properties that Ásta develops and 
defends in Categories We Live By persuasive in many ways. For one thing, it resists 
the temptation to simplify the social world too much, instead engaging head-on 
with the multiplicity and variability of social kinds. For another, the focus on con-
straints and enablements strikes me as philosophically important and politically 
helpful: as Ásta puts it, these are “categories that matter to our social life” (29).
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In this paper, I make an internal critique of conferralism, arguing that con-
ferralism could do better, by its own lights, at handling the phenomenon of 
intersectionality. In order to help make this point, I will first suggest a friendly 
amendment to the schema for conferrals that Ásta offers. This in turn will help me 
to explain the difficulty concerning intersectionality. Finally, I shall suggest a way 
of developing the conferralist account that would resolve this difficulty.
2   The Role of Constraints and Enablements in the 
Conferral Schema
Ásta offers a schema to illustrate how conferrals work. This schema consists of 
five aspects that matter in a conferral:
Conferred property: what property is conferred…
Who: who the [conferring] subjects are…
What: what attitude, state, or action of the subjects matter…
When: under what conditions the conferral takes place…
Base property: what the subjects are attempting to track (consciously or not), if anything… 
(21)
Here is an example of a filled-in conferral schema that Ásta gives:
Conferred property: being elected president of the US
Who: the current US vice president, as president of the US Senate; this is the entity in 
authority
What: the declaration that someone has received the most electoral college votes for US 
President
When: on January 6, following a November election, starting at 1 p.m.
Base property: the majority of electoral college votes, that is, 270 or more (23)
I want to suggest that something odd is going on with the first element of the con-
ferral schema, the conferred property. To understand my concern, it is necessary 
to note that, for Ásta, a social property is a social status (49), and a social status 
consists of constraints and enablements (2). So one might think that the conferred 
property element would list the constraint and enablements that constitute the 
status that is the property in question. However, the examples Ásta gives of the 
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“conferred property” component instead always given the name of the conferred 
property, such as “being elected president of the US”, or “being a woman”, and 
not the constraints and enablements that constitute the status in question. But 
there is a problem here: the same name can refer to different properties – dif-
ferent, that is, in the sense of being equated with a different status and hence 
consisting of different constraints and enablements.
For example, consider the following two possible worlds. In w1, the prop-
erty being the president of the US is exactly as it is in the actual world. It follows 
the conferral schema specified by Ásta, and involves all of the powers, duties 
and prerogatives with which we are familiar. In w2, the procedure for selecting 
the president of the US is exactly the same as in w1, but the presidency is exclu-
sively a ceremonial role, involving far fewer powers, duties and prerogatives. For 
example, in w1 the president has the nuclear codes, and in w2 they do not. These 
are two different properties, because they are constituted by different constraints 
and enablements. Yet this difference vanishes in Ásta’s conferral schema: if we 
were to fill out the conferral schema for the property of being the president in w2, it 
would look exactly the same as the schema for the property of being the president 
in w1.
The problem, I think, is that under the “conferred property” element of the 
schema, Ásta typically gives the name of the property; whereas what we actually 
need to specify in order to fully understand the conferred property is the con-
straints and enablements that constitute the social status. It is these constraints 
and enablements that are different with regard to the property being the presi-
dent in w1 and w2, for instance. To my mind, the most natural way of fixing this 
problem is to split the “conferred property” element of the schema into two com-
ponents: (1) the name of the property (“property name”), and (2) the constraints 
and enablements that constitute the conferred status (“status”).1 The resulting 
schema would look like this:
Property name: the name of the property that is conferred, e.g. “being the president of 
the US”
Status: The constraints and enablements that constitute the social status that is the con-
ferred property
1 I think we need to accept that in many cases, the status component will be very complex and 
we would not be able to spell it out perfectly. This is not, in my view, a problem, as I take it that 
conferral schemas are in any case an articulation of a complex social situation that typically 
involves some level of generalisation. For example, it is sometimes not practically possible to 
give all the details of what the base property is for a particular conferred property, either because 
we do not have the relevant knowledge or because it is simply too complicated to express in a 
reasonable amount of space.
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Who: who the conferring subjects are
What: what attitude, state, or action of the subjects matter
When: under what conditions the conferral takes place
Base property: what the subjects are attempting to track (consciously or not), if anything
This expanded schema will help me to explain the difficulty that conferralism 
faces concerning intersectionality.
3   Intersectionality: A Brief Explanation
The concept of intersectionality, roughly speaking, captures the idea that differ-
ent dimensions of oppression are not additive, simply stacking one on top of the 
other; rather, what may seem to be different dimensions of oppression actually 
interact in complex ways, and may even be impossible to fully distinguish from 
one another. The term was coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw, although the concept 
has a much longer history in Black feminist thought (Combahee River Collective 
1986; Crenshaw 1989, 1991). A note about language: I will refer to kinds that require 
a multi-part label, such as Black women, as “intersectional kinds”, and I will refer 
to kinds that have a single-part label, such as women, as “single-moniker kinds”.2 
Following Ann Garry (2011), I take intersectionality to be a “framework checker”. 
On this view, intersectionality as such does not constitute an account of social 
categories, power, agency, identity, and so on; rather, it provides a standard that 
theories purporting to illuminate these phenomena should meet (see also Grillo 
1995).
There are at least three different insights that are included in the concept 
of intersectionality. First, there is the thought that oppression is non-additive, 
which is to say that we cannot gain knowledge about Black women’s oppres-
sion, for instance, simply by adding together some general claims about race-
based oppression and some general claims about gender-based oppression. For 
example, suppose that, in a certain social context, we know that women are less 
likely to be in paid employment than men, and Black people are less likely to 
be in paid employment than women. An additive approach would license the 
2 The reason I do not want to refer to kinds such as “women” as “non-intersectional kinds” is 
that there is a sense of intersectionality in which these kinds, too, are intersectional: each of their 
members occupies multiple single-moniker kinds, such that no kind lies outside of the enmesh-
ment of power that the concept of intersectionality highlights.
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assumption that Black women are especially unlikely to be in paid employment 
– they are unlikely “twice over”, as it were. But this may well be wrong. For 
example, it might be that Black women are employed at higher rates than White 
women and higher rates than Black men, because Black woman, unlike White 
women, are subject to economic pressure to take on paid work, and because there 
are many domestic service jobs available for which Black women, unlike Black 
men, are considered suitable employees.
The second, closely related thought is that oppression is non-separable: 
the oppression experienced by woman of colour, for example, cannot be neatly 
separated into oppression experienced “on the basis of race” and oppression 
experienced “on the basis of gender”. For example, suppose that a Black woman 
is presumed by the police to be a sex worker, and is arrested. Did this happen 
“because she is a woman”, or “because she is Black”? Non-separability high-
lights the misguided nature of questions such as these, which assume that the 
effects of race and gender categorization are neatly separable. Rejecting the frag-
menting of identity represented by these questions (Grillo 1995),  non-separability 
directs us to treat race and gender as thoroughly intermeshed and impossible to 
separate.
There is an intimate connection between non-additiveness and non-separability, 
but they are slightly different: non-additiveness cautions us against thinking that 
we can make predictions about intersectional kinds based on what we know 
about single-moniker kinds, whereas non-separability cautions us against think-
ing that we can use single-moniker kinds to explain the experiences of members 
of intersectional kinds.
The third thought, which is a rather stronger claim than the first two, is that 
oppressive categories involve cross-constitution or mutual construction. It is not 
just that race and gender interact to underpin forms of oppression that are non-
additive and non-separable; rather, race plays a crucial role in constructing the 
reality of gender, and vice versa. In other words, gender could not be what it is if 
race did not exist, and race could not be what it is if gender did not exist (Lugones 
2007; Garry 2011; Bernstein 2020).
I take it that cross-constitution is necessarily a metaphysical claim, whereas 
non-additiveness and non-separability can be interpreted either as metaphysical 
claims – claims about the way that oppression is – or as epistemic claims – claims 
about what we can know about oppression. Of these two options, the metaphysi-
cal version is stronger and places more demands on a theory. In order to have the 
broadest possible appeal, then, an account of social kinds should be compatible 
with the metaphysical versions of non-additiveness and non-separability, as well 
as with cross-constitution.
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4   Ásta on Intersectionality
Ásta clearly intends for conferralism to be sensitive to intersectionality (6; 81; 
125). In regard to the intersectional nature of social properties, she writes:
The general story is that we have features, and some of those features have social signifi-
cance in a context, and the status we enjoy in a particular context is the result of the con-
straints and enablements that the presence of each and every one of our socially significant 
features brings, where the presence of some features can trump others. (125, italics mine)
The acknowledgement that “the presence of some features can trump others” 
conforms with the idea that oppression is non-additive, which is the first compo-
nent of intersectionality. I take it that the thought here is that although a person’s 
overall social status is the result of all the different constraints and enablements 
that they are under as a result of each of their various socially significant fea-
tures, this result is not a straightforward matter of adding up all the different 
constraints and enablements, but something much more complicated, in which 
different features can interact.
However, the way that Ásta talks about overall, intersectional status as the 
“result of the constraints and enablements that each and every one of our socially 
significant features brings” (125) seems to imply that there is a set of constraints 
and enablements that a given feature brings. For example, Ásta gives separate 
conferral schemas for race and gender properties. That is, she gives conferral 
schemas for properties such as being a woman (74–75), and being Black (99), and 
these conferral schemes do not make reference to one another. My worry is this: 
in giving separate conferral schemas for single-moniker properties in this way, 
even ones that are admitted to interact, Ásta appears to commit herself to the 
view that race and gender kinds can be neatly distinguished from one another, 
thereby going against non-separability, and that they exist independently of one 
another, thereby going against cross-constitution.
Now, it is possible that non-additiveness is the only aspect of intersection-
ality that Ásta accepts, and that she would be content with an account that is 
not compatible with non-separability or with cross-constitution. So she could in 
theory respond to this worry by simply rejecting the demand to accord with non-
separability and cross-constitution. However, there are two reasons why I think 
this response would be a mistake.
Firstly, it seems to me that these further components of intersectionality are 
widely accepted among feminists, such that this move would seriously narrow 
the appeal of conferralism and should, for that reason, be avoided if possible. 
Secondly, the picture of separate single-moniker properties that interact (perhaps 
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non-additively) seems to render the constraints and enablements that constitute 
each such property somewhat mysterious, such that there is a reason to probe 
further even if we were satisfied with just meeting non-additiveness. To put the 
point simply, it is not clear to me where the constraints and enablements that con-
stitute a single-moniker property are meant to come from.
This point can be put more precisely by drawing on the amendment to the 
conferral schema that I suggested above: I am puzzled as to how we are sup-
posed to spell out the status element of the schema for a single-moniker race or 
gender property. For example, if the ways in which a Black woman is constrained/
enabled in a certain context are significantly different from the ways in which a 
White woman is constrained/enabled and the ways in which a Black man are 
constrained/enabled, what determines the constraints and enablements that 
constitute the social status Black or the social status woman? I have not been able 
to find a clear answer to this question in Ásta’s account of conferralism. My aim 
in the rest of this section, then, is to expand on Ásta’s account of constraints and 
enablements in order to answer this question in a way that renders conferralism 
compatible with all three components of intersectionality.
5   Understanding Constraints and Enablements
A good place to begin is by asking what, exactly, it means for someone to be 
subject to a constraint on or enablement to their behaviour in a context. Ásta 
states that “social categories get formed and maintained through the individual 
actions of classifying and placing” (125). She also makes it very clear that what 
matters for the creation of constraints and enablements is the actual behaviour of 
individual agents in social contexts, not the mental associations that the agents 
have concerning the members of the social status kind of the feature that confer-
rals are tracking (48). This means that communal properties can be conferred 
without the conscious awareness of those doing the conferring. I take it that if 
there are regularities in the actions and responses of the conferrers that are sen-
sitive to certain properties, and if these regularities make a difference to what 
is possible for the relevant individuals, then we can say that there is a confer-
ral taking place that involves the tracking of a base property (or properties). If 
the conferring subject is not aware of the regularities in her responses or of the 
role played by the base property, we can say that the conferral is implicit and the 
tracking is unconscious, but it is still a conferral. The exact psychological mecha-
nisms that underpin these regularities need not be specified, nor do they need 
to be consistent – there may well be many different mechanisms underpinning 
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different instances of behaviour. What ultimately matters is not what the agents 
think about the people or properties in question, but how they behave, because it 
is their behaviour that generates the constraints and enablements that constitute 
social status.
Once such constraints and enablements are understood in this way, it seems 
to me very natural to interpret them as probabilistic. For example, even in con-
texts where very sexist attitudes and implicit bias abound and women are rou-
tinely talked over, talked down to, and so on, it is not uncommon for a particular 
woman to manage not to be treated in this way on a particular occasion. But it 
does not follow that there is after all no constraint concerning women’s inter-
personal interactions in such contexts. Rather, the conferralist can think about 
the constraints and enablements as probabilistic: to be under a constraint con-
cerning behaviour B does not necessarily mean that one can never manage to do 
B; it may equally mean that the chances of a given attempt to do B succeeding 
are lower for one than they are for members of the relevant comparison group. 
Brännmark (2018a) offers a similar account of constraints and enablements as 
probabilistic, although his focus is solely on deontic constraints and enablements 
(social perceptions of duties, prerogatives, and so forth).
Taken together, these two points suggest that constraints and enablements 
are constituted by actual incidents of behaviour that make it the case that an 
individual’s having certain features in that context raises and/or lowers the prob-
ability that they will be able to do or to avoid certain things. A socially significant 
feature, then, is one that has predictive power when it comes to describing the 
patterns in these incidents in a certain context. A background view that supports 
this picture, and which I endorse, is the idea that social kinds are explanatory 
kinds, and that kinds are explanatory (or not) relative to particular explanatory 
purposes or projects (Haslanger 2016).
The key to squaring conferralism with the second and third insights of 
intersectionality lies in recognising that there are different levels of generality, 
or granularity, at which we could specify these constraints and enablements. 
For example, specifying separately the constraints and enablements on women 
who are differently racialised in a context is more fine-grained than specify-
ing the constraints and enablements on women simpliciter. Saying that women 
have a 70% chance of being interrupted when they try to talk in a certain 
meeting is less fine-grained than saying that White women have a 50% chance, 
Asian women have an 85% chance, and so on, for differently racialised groups. 
And this in turn is less fine-grained than if we were to also separate women by 
age, or by class, or by their job role in the relevant organisation, and so on. The 
level of granularity that is most useful to us will depend on our explanatory 
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purposes. Here, my view accords with the approach to intersectionality taken 
by Brännmark (2018b, p. 15) in relation to institutional kinds (kinds character-
ised by deontic relations).
It is worth noting that there may be contexts in which there are no patterns 
that unite the different intersectional kinds that constitute a single-moniker kind. 
In such cases, there are no single-moniker kinds, but only intersectional kinds. 
Imagine a bar that is both extremely racist and extremely sexist. Black women 
work as waitresses. Black men work as bartenders. White men are customers who 
order and pay for drinks. White women are patrons, but not customers: they only 
frequent the bar as the guests of White men patrons, who order and pay for drinks 
on their behalf. If a White woman arrived at the bar, she would be assumed to 
be there to meet a White man, rather than being a customer in her own right. 
If a Black woman arrived, she would be assumed to be a waitress (or someone 
seeking work as a waitress) rather than a patron of any sort. In this case the con-
straints and enablements that characterise the status of the White women and 
the constraints and enablements that characterise the status of the Black women 
have very little, if anything, in common.
The social dynamics of the bar can be best explained by way of intersectional 
kinds such as Black women and White women, not single-moniker social status 
kinds such as women. Suppose Audre, a Black woman, enters the bar by herself 
and tries, unsuccessfully, to order a drink. Why can not Audre manage to order a 
drink? Because Audre is a Black woman, and everyone assumes she is a waitress, 
or perhaps is looking for work as a waitress. Now, we could try to answer the 
question by saying instead: because Audre is a woman, and women do not order 
drinks here. But this is much less explanatory: it does not tell us what people 
expect Audre to do instead of ordering drinks, and it obscures the difference 
between Audre’s situation and the situation of Betty, a White woman, who also 
cannot order a drink. In Betty’s case, this is because she is assumed to be the 
guest of a White man, who will order on her behalf; whereas in Audre’s case, this 
is because she is not considered to be a patron at all. We get a much more inform-
ative and accurate picture of why Audre cannot order a drink if we operate with 
the intersectional kind Black woman than with the single-moniker kind woman. 
Accordingly, in this specific social context, we might want to say that there is no 
such conferred kind as woman simpliciter.3
3 Whether we ultimately ought to say this will depend on the other constraints and enablements 
that are in play in the context – I have only focused on one constraint (not being able to order a 
drink).
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6   Meeting the Demands of Intersectionality
As we saw above, the way in which Ásta talks about intersectionality seems to 
imply that there are constraints and enablements for single-moniker kinds that 
combine (potentially in non-additive ways) in order to produce the constraints 
and enablements for intersectional kinds. It is this picture that seems to stand in 
tension to the second and third aspects of intersectionality, and also to stand in 
need of further explanation. The understanding of constraints and enablements 
that I have set out here, however, reverses the picture. Ontologically speaking, it is 
not the case that we begin with constraints and enablements for single-moniker 
kinds which then combine (potentially in non-additive ways) for intersectional 
kinds. Instead, what comes first, ontologically speaking, is the actual incidents 
of behaviour, and the consequent abilities of different individuals to effect or 
to avoid various outcomes in a certain context. Patterns in these incidents of 
behaviour allow us to articulate constraints and enablements, initially for mul-
tiply intersectional kinds (e.g. disabled Black lesbian women). We can then take 
a more and more coarse-grained approach to describing these patterns that will 
give us simpler intersectional kinds (e.g. Black women) until finally we arrive at 
single-moniker kinds (e.g. women).
This analysis treats intersectional social status kinds as more ontologically 
basic than single-moniker social status kinds, but does not require us to reject 
the existence of single-moniker social kinds.4 Of course, establishing the level of 
description that is helpful for a particular enquiry is a substantive task, and I take 
it that one of the lessons of intersectionality theory is that we ought to be very 
careful not to assume that the most general level of description is usually going to 
be the most helpful. Granted, this model is somewhat messier than one on which 
we only acknowledge the existence of the most coarse-grained, single-moniker 
kinds; but the social world is messy, and we should expect some of this messiness 
to have to be reflected in our theories of it.
This way of understanding constraints and enablements renders conferral-
ism compatible with non-separability and with cross-constitution. It conforms to 
non-separability because conferral schemas for race kinds and for gender kinds 
are only an approximation of the actual constraints and enablements that are 
at play, and are acknowledged to involve a large amount of generalisation. As a 
result, they should not be understood as implying that those constraints can be 
4 For a discussion of intersectionality that give a somewhat different picture of the ontological 
priority of intersectional kinds, involving the metaphysical and explanatory priority of intersec-
tional “wholes” over single-moniker “parts”, see Bernstein (2020).
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perfectly or truly separated into those relating to race and those relating to gender; 
the separation is a rough approximation of the complex truth. The understanding 
I have developed is also compatible with cross-constitution, because each single-
moniker gender kind is a generalisation based on a number of intersectional 
kinds that involve race as a component, and vice versa for single-moniker race 
kinds and intersectional kinds involving gender as a component. Thus, race plays 
a role in constituting the reality of gender, and gender plays a role in constituting 
the reality of race.
7   Conclusion
I have advanced an internal critique of conferralism based on its handling 
of intersectionality, and I have suggested a modification to the account to 
solve this difficulty. First, I showed that Ásta’s conferral schema obscures 
the important difference between the name of a property, on the one hand, 
and the constraints and enablements of which it consists, on the other. I pro-
posed an expanded conferral schema that includes a “property name” com-
ponent and a “status” component as separate elements. Second, I used this 
expanded conferral schema to help argue that conferralism appears to strug-
gle to meet some of the demands of intersectionality, specifically those relat-
ing to the non-separability of race and gender properties and their nature as 
cross-constituting. I proposed an understanding of conferred properties that 
gives ontological priority to the most fine-grained intersectional properties, 
and treats single-moniker properties as generalisations or abstractions that 
may be helpful in the context of particular explanatory projects. The result of 
incorporating this understanding would, I believe, be a version of conferral-
ism that is more attractive by its own lights, with a broader appeal and greater 
explanatory power.
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